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RECENT LEGISLATION 
FEDERAL PROCEDURE-JURISDICTION-STATUTORY CHANGE IN JURISDICTIONAL 
AMouNT AND CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP-A recent congressional amendment 
of federal district court jurisdictional requirements for both diversity of 
citizenship and federal question litigation1 has raised the required amount 
in controversy from $3,000 to $10,000. The trial court has also been given 
discretion either to deny costs or assess them against the plaintiff if he is 
finally adjudged entitled to recover less than $10,000, determined without 
1 H.R. 11102, 85th Cong., 2d sess. (1958); 72 Stat. 415. Approved July 25, 1958. 
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regard to any set-off or counterclaim and exclusive of interest and costs.2 
Further, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction and removal, a corporation 
is now deemed a citizen "of any State by which it has been incorporated 
and of the State where it has its principal place of business." 28 U.S.C. 
(Supp. V, 1958) §§1331, 1332.3 
The reasoning behind enlargement of the corporate "citizenship" 
concept is not entirely clear. Congress may have been primarily interested 
either in reducing the district court caseload4 or in eliminating a portion 
of diversity jurisdiction as an end in itself.5 Alternatively, the purpose may 
have been to confine this jurisdiction to its original rationale. The raison 
d'etre of diversity jurisdiction is a fear of possible state court prejudice 
against out-of-state litigants.6 By settled law prior to this amendment, for 
diversity purposes, a corporation was a "citizen" only of its state of in-
corporation.7 Thus a business incorporated in state A whose operations 
were in state B was qualified to litigate a claim against a citizen of state B 
in a federal court in that state. Yet where a corporation is engaged in a 
substantial amount of activity in the state of the opposing litigant, it is 
hardly possible that any prejudice against the corporation would exist 
because of its incorporation in another state.8 Clearly, then, the present 
2 This latter stipulation, designed to discourage inflated claims, will be of particular 
significance in tort litigation. It is inapplicable when an express provision is otherwise 
made in another federal statute. In general, the change in jurisdictional amount is ex-
pected to lessen by over 7% the number of district court civil suits. This reduction will 
appear primarily in diversity cases since the only significant federal question controversies 
affected, those arising under the Jones Act and those contesting the constitutionality of 
state statutes, usually involve an amount in excess of $10,000. See, generally, H. Hearings 
before Subcommittee No. 3 of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 2516 and H.R. 
4497, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 24 (1957); H. Rep. 1706, 85th Cong., 2d sess., p. 5 (1958). 
s The amending provisions apply only to actions commenced after the date of enact-
ment. In federal courts an action is commenced by filing the complaint. Rule 3, Fed. 
Rules Civ. Proc. 28 U.S.C. (1952). However, when a suit begun in a state court prior to 
enactment is removed to federal court after that date, it is unclear when such suit was 
"commenced" within the meaning of the amendment. Compare Lorraine Motors, Inc. v. 
Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., (E.D. N.Y. 1958) 166 F. Supp. 319, with Kieffer v. Travelers 
Fire Ins. Co., (D.C. Md. 1958) 27 U.S. LAW WEEK 2223. 
4 Since World War II, civil cases filed in the district courts have increased 75%. Most 
of this increase has been in diversity cases, and 60% of these involve corporations. H. Rep. 
1706, 85th Cong., 2d sess., p. 2. What statistics are available indicate that the present 
amendment will eliminate from 3.6% to 23.4% of corporate diversity litigation. H. Hear-
ings before Subcommittee No. 3 of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 2516 and H.R. 
4497, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 43 (1957). 
5 Many authorities believe that the original reasons for diversity jurisdiction have 
now almost disappeared, and that this jurisdiction should be radically cut down. See 
Warren, "New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789," 37 HARV. L. 
REv. 49 at 132 (1923). See, generally, Reed, "Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil 
Actions," 55 MICH. L. REv. 327, 483 at 519-522 (1957). 
6 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. (14 U.S.) 304 at 347 (1816). 
7 Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line, 215 U.S. 501 (1910). 
s See, generally, Wechsler, "Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial 
Code," 13 LAw & CoNTEM. PROB. 216 (1948); Doub, "Time for Re-Evaluation: Shall We 
Curtail Diversity Jurisdiction?" 44 A.B.A.J. 243 (1958). 
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extension of co1;porate "citizenship" will properly eliminate from federal 
courts some of the litigation where the fear of state prejudice is unfounded. 
This statutory extension of "citizenship" only to the state of the corpora-
tion's principal place of business would, however, seem to be inadequate 
to eliminate all such cases. It is at least arguable that the concept should 
have been further broadened to make the corporation a "citizen" of any 
state in which it carries on a substantial amount of activity. The amend-
ment may be criticized also for leaving largely undefined the meaning of 
"principal place of business." Congress felt that "there is provided suffi-
cient criteria to guide courts in future litigation under this bill"9 since 
the test has ample precedent in decisions construing other federal statutes, 
notably the Bankruptcy Act.1° Cases under that act treat the question of 
locating a corporation's "principal place of business" as one of fact, to be 
determined by studying and balancing the circumstances of the particular 
case.11 Important factors that enter into consideration include the situs 
of the chief manufacturing plant,12 the place where the business is generally 
conducted,13 and the dominant purpose of the corporation.14 On the other 
hand, location of board and stockholder meetings, the place where meet-
ing records and stock transfer books are kept, and recitals that the home 
office is the principal place of business are relatively unimportant.15 But 
it was early recognized that it is impossible to lay down any general rule 
for determining which of several places at which a corporation does 
business is its "principal" location.16 For this reason preliminary litigation 
over the question of "principal place of business" may offset much of the 
economy of time which should otherwise result from the likely reduction in 
the federal courts' caseload.17 Since the amendment fails to restrict diversity 
litigation to situations which would support its rationale and because it 
leaves unsettled the meaning of the applicable test, limitation of federal 
diversity jurisdiction as to corporations doing business in foreign states 
may be only the weak ancestor of legislation to come. 
Philip Belleville 
o H. Rep. 1706, 85th Cong., 2d sess., p. 4 (1958). 
10 Bankruptcy courts are given jurisdiction over persons who, among other things, 
"have had their principal place of business" within the jurisdiction for the preceding 
6 months. 66 Stat. 420, 11 U.S.C. (1952) §11. 
11 See, e.g., In re Pusey & Jones Co., (2d Cir. 1922) 286 F. 88, cert. den. 261 U.S. 623 
(1923). 
12 In re American & British Mfg. Co., (D.C. Conn. 1924) 300 F. 839; In re E. & G. 
Theatre Co., (D.C. Mass. 1915) 223 F. 657. 
13 Ibid. 
14In re Pusey & Jones Co., note 11 supra; In re Devonian Mineral Spring Co., (D.C. 
Ohio 1920) 272 F. 527. 
15 See Dryden v. Ranger Refining & Pipe Line Co., (2d Cir. 1922) 280 F. 257, cert. 
den. 260 U.S. 726 (1922); In re American & British Mfg. Co., note 12 supra. 
16 In re Worcester Footwear Co., (D.C. Mass. 1948) 251 F. 760 at 761. 
17 See note 4 supra. 
